ABSTRACT: The creation of the euro at the beginning of 1999 represents one of the most significant events in international finance since the end of World War II. Never in the past had a group of sovereign nations voluntarily given up their national currency for a common currency. The article begins by reviewing the benefits and costs of the euro on the participating countries; it then examines the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the conduct of monetary policy in the European Monetary Union, as well as its effect on the euro/dollar and euro/yen exchange rates; finally, the article analyzes the effect that the ECB has and is likely to have on the functioning of the international monetary system.
T HE creation of the euro at the beginning of 1999 represents one of the most significant events in international finance since the end of World War II-second in importance only to the formation of the Bretton Woods System in 1947 and its collapse in 1973. Never in the past had a group of sovereign nations voluntarily given up their national currency for a common currency. Eleven of the fifteen members of the European Union (EU) adopted the new currency at its inception, and Greece joined them in January 2001. Only the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark have thus far refused to participate, but they reserved the right to join later.
The euro will begin to circulate as the currency of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in January 2001, and the national currencies of the participating countries will be completely withdrawn from circulation by February 2002, when the euro will become the sole currency of the EMU.
This article begins by reviewing the benefits and costs of the euro for the participating countries; it will then examine the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the conduct of monetary policy in the EMU, as well as its effect on the euro/dollar and euro/yen exchange rates; finally, the article will analyze the effect that the ECB has and is likely to have on the functioning of the international monetary system.
THE BENEFITS OF THE EURO
The effects of the introduction of the euro have been amply examined in both Europe and in the United States, and most economists on both sides of the Atlantic generally agree with the analysis and with the benefits and costs that are likely to result from its introduction. The benefits are the following: (1) the elimination of the need to exchange currencies among EU members (this has been estimated to save as much as $30 billion per year), (2) the elimination of excessive volatility among EMU currencies (fluctuations will occur only between the euro and the dollar, the yen, and the currencies of other non-EMU nations), (3) more rapid economic and financial integration among EU members, (4) the ability of the ECB to conduct a more expansionary monetary policy than that practically imposed in the past by the Bundesbank on the EU countries, and (5) greater economic discipline for countries, such as Italy, Belgium, and Greece, that seemed unwilling or unable to bring their fiscal house in order without externally imposed conditions.
Other benefits of the euro for EMU members are (6) seignorage from the use of the euro as an international currency (the use of the dollar as an international currency confers about 10 to 15 billion dollars in benefits to the United States, and the expectation is that the euro could provide as much seignorage to the EMU), (7) reduction in the cost of borrowing in international financial markets (it has been estimated that the U.S. cost of borrowing on international financial markets is about 0.25 to 0.50 percentage points lower than it would have been the case if the dollar were not used as an international currency, for a total savings of about 10 to 15 billion dollars, and the expectation is that the EMU could gain as much from the use of the euro as an international currency), and last but not least, (8) the greater economic and political importance that the EU will acquire in international affairs.
There is, however, a concern in the United States that the EU might use this increased power to become more confrontational in transatlantic relations (see Feldstein 2000) . To be sure, when there are real and important disagreements, it is only proper and fair for the EU to use its newly acquired clout to protect and foster its economic and political interests. The hope, however, is that it will not pursue anti-American policies to provide the glue that unites and keeps the union together, or for its own sake simply to assert its power. Similarly, the increased economic and political importance of the EU in international affairs will check American power now that the fear of communism has vanished and the Soviet Union has collapsed as a military superpower. While some Americans may fear the competition that the euro will provide for the U.S. dollar as an international or vehicle currency, this competition will be beneficial, not harmful, to the United States in the long run because it will impose more discipline in the conduct of its economic policies than has been the case in previous decades.
THE MAJOR PROBLEM WITH THE EURO
The most serious (and yet untested) problem that the establishment of an ECB and the euro may create for the EMU is a member nation's response to an asymmetric demand or supply shock. It is practically inevitable that a large and diverse single-currency area as the EMU will face periodic asymmetric shocks that will affect various member nations differently and drive their economies out of alignment. In such a case, there is little that a nation adversely affected can do. It is clear that the nation cannot use expansionary monetary policy or devalue (or allow its currency to depreciate) to overcome a recession or an excessive slowdown in growth because of the existence of the single currency. Fiscal discipline also prevents the nation from adopting an expansionary fiscal policy (see Salvatore 1996 Salvatore , 1997 Salvatore , 1998b . The only possibility is downward wage adjustment. Since wages are rigid downward, however, this instrument has never been used, and it is very likely that labor would not allow it to be used (see Salvatore 1998b) .
A single currency works well in the United States because if one of its regions suffered from an asymmetric shock, workers would move quickly and in great numbers out of the region adversely affected by the shock and toward areas of the nation with greater employment opportunities. This escape hatch is not generally available to Europe to the same extent as in the United States because of much lower labor mobility. Bayoumi and Masson 1994) . In the EU, on the other hand, fiscal redistribution cannot be of much help because the EU budget is less than 1.5 percent of the EU's GDP, and almost half of it is devoted to its Common Agricultural Policy. Furthermore, real wages are more downwardly flexible in the United States than in the EU.
Facing an asymmetric shock, the United Kingdom and Italy opted to leave the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) in September 1992 and, by allowing their currencies to depreciate and by lowering their interest rates, were able to move out of the deep recession in which they found themselves. With a single currency, this policy move would have been impossible. Remaining in the ERM in September 1992 would have meant Britain and Italy standing idly by and watching their unemployment rates increase from already very high levels until the recession came to an end by itself, gradually, over time. No government can afford to stand idly by and remain inert in such a situation. In any event, massive speculation against the pound and the lira forced a depreciation of those currencies in September 1992, an event that helped them overcome the recession. It is true that the establishment of a single currency will prevent such speculative attacks, but that also means that with a single currency, the nation will have almost no policy choice available to overcome a negative asymmetric shock. It will simply have to wait for the recession to be cured by itself.
Supporters of the single currency reply that the requirements for the establishment of single currency will necessarily increase labor market flexibility, and by promoting greater intra-EU trade, a single currency will also dampen nationally differentiated business cycles. Furthermore, it is pointed out that highly integrated EU capital markets can make up for low labor market flexibility and provide an adequate automatic response to asymmetric shocks. These automatic responses may not be sufficient, however. It is also true that meeting the Maastricht criteria will increase labor market flexibility, but this is at best a slow process, and it may not be allowed to take place to a sufficient degree if EU labor insists on retaining many of its present benefits (such as strong job security and high unemployment pay). Furthermore, "excessive" capital flows may work perversely by reducing the incentive for the introduction of fundamental labor-market-liberalizing measures, and by pushing up the euro exchange rate, they may even produce supply shocks of their own in the EMU member.
In the final analysis, a major asymmetric shock may result in unbearable pressure within the EU because of limited labor mobility, grossly inadequate fiscal redistribution, and a ECB that will probably want to keep monetary conditions tight to hold inflation at bay and to make the euro as strong as the dollar. Some indication of the type of problem that the EU may be facing is given by the fact that during the past two years, Ireland has faced very high growth and inflation rates while Germany and Italy were growing sluggishly. This meant that the ECB should have tightened monetary policy to cool Ireland off and adopted an expansionary monetary policy to stimulate growth in Germany and Italy. A much larger asymmetric shock could create a much greater problem in the EMU, and it is impossible to anticipate a key EMU member's reaction to it. It is true that in an international financial system ever more integrated, the ability of a nation to conduct even a semiautonomous monetary and exchange rate policy is very limited, but with a single currency, a nation will not be able to conduct any monetary or exchange rate policy. Table 1 identifies the EMU and the EU members with a lower and a higher-than-average probability of facing an asymmetric shock and with a lower and a higher-than-average labor-market inflexibility. The table shows that Finland, Greece, Italy, and Spain among EMU members (as well as Sweden, an EU but a non-EMU member) have a high probability of facing an asymmetric shock (in relations to the EMU average) and have the most inflexible labor markets. These are the countries that are likely to face the greatest problems and costs from belonging to the EMU in the future.
As to whether economic integration within the EMU reduces or increases the frequency and magnitude of asymmetric shocks, there is a great deal of disagreement. Eichengreen (1993, 1996) provided econometric evidence that asymmetric shocks among EMU countries are more frequent and of greater magnitude than among U.S. states. This conclusion is shared by Krugman (1993) , who pointed out that the adoption of a single currency was likely to lead to greater regional specialization and, therefore, to a greater likelihood of asymmetric shocks over time. Frankel and Rose (1998) , on the other hand, argued that greater economic integration (through trade and capital flows) was likely to result in more highly correlated cyclical conditions as the economic structure of EMU members adapts to the currency union. Although the available data to date are insufficient to resolve this disagreement, most economists do believe that greater economic and financial integration does enhance the effectiveness of the common monetary policy in member nations (see Fratianni, Salvatore, and von Hagen 1997; OECD 1999 OECD , 2000a Angeloni and Mojon 2000) .
THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND THE COMMON MONETARY POLICY
On 30 June 1998, the ECB was inaugurated in Frankfurt with Wim Duisenberg, the former head of the Dutch Central Bank, as its first governor. The ECB was established as the operating arm of the European System of Central Banks or Eurosystem, a federal structure of the national central banks (NCBs) of the euro area. The ECB assumed responsibility for unionwide monetary policy for the eleven countries of the euro zone forming the EMU, as scheduled, on 1 January 1999. ECB's monetary decisions are made by a majority vote of the Governing Council, composed of a six-member executive board (which includes the ECB president, Wim Duisenberg, and its chief economist and former chief economist of the Bundesbank, Otmar Issing) serving a single, nonrenewable eight-year term and the heads of the eleven NCBs (twelve since January 2001 when Greece was admitted).
The Maastricht Treaty entrusted the ECB with the sole mandate of pursuing price stability, defined as an annual inflation rate of less than 2 percent in the medium term for the euro area as a whole (Duisenberg 1999; Issing 2000a) . Specifically, the Governing Council adopted the following definition of price stability: "Price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area as a whole of less than 2% to be maintained over the medium term" (ECB 1999, 40) . This fact makes the ECB the world's most independent central bank. The ECB is only required to brief regularly the European parliament on its activities, but the European parliament has no power to influence ECB's decisions.
This situation contrasts sharply to that under which the U.S. Fed, which is constitutionally required to pursue both price stability (by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913) and full employment (by the Employment Act of 1946 and the Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978), operates, a circumstance that limits somewhat its effectiveness as an inflation fighter when a conflict arises between its two goals. Furthermore, while the U.S. Congress could pass laws reducing the independence of the Federal Reserve Board, the Maastricht Treaty itself would have to be amended by the legislatures or voters in every member country for the ECB's statute to be changed. The almost total independence of the ECB from political influences was deliberate so as to shield the ECB from political influences that might force it to provide excessive monetary stimulus and thus lead to inflation. But this also led to the criticism that the ECB is distant and undemocratic and not responsive to the economic needs of EMU citizens.
The conduct of monetary policy (i.e., the setting of interest rates) is based on the analysis of the so-called two pillars. The first pillar of the Eurosystem's monetary policy strategy is the announced money-supply target or, more precisely, the quantitative reference value for monetary growth by the Governing Council. This is a growth of the broad money aggregate M3 of 4.5 percent, which is believed to be compatible with price stability. However, since it may be difficult to define and interpret measures of the eurowide money supply and guarantee that a stable relationship exists between the money supply and inflation, the Governing Council decided to supplement its announced quantitative reference value for monetary growth with a second pillar in the form of a broadly based assessment of the outlook of price developments and risks to price stability to monitor performance against its inflation target better. This assessment of the outlook for prices or second pillar is made by using a wide range of financial and other economic indicators that include wages and unit labor costs, fiscal policy indicators, financial market indicators (such as asset prices), and the exchange rate of the euro (Ising 2000b) .
The Eurosystem adopts a neutral stance about the international role of the euro. That is, its stated aim is neither to hinder nor to promote its international role (say, as a challenger to the U.S. dollar) but to leave its value entirely to market forces. The belief is that doing otherwise would compromise the achievement of its main goal of price stability. Of course, to the extent that the Eurosystem succeeds in maintaining price stability, it will also inevitably increase the international role of the euro. The Eurosystem's choice not to use exchange rate targets for the euro is based on the correct conviction that the exchange rate of the euro is the outcome of monetary and fiscal policies, as well as of cyclical THE EURO and structural forces, in the euro area and abroad, and should not itself be an objective or aim of the Eurosystem. Only if the euro were to become grossly misaligned would the EMU Ministers of Finance (who are ultimately responsible for the exchange rare of the euro) issue general orientation statements on what it considers an appropriate range for the international value of the euro.
Although the Eurosystem has neither an explicit nor an implicit exchange rate target or range for the euro, the exchange rate of the euro has important implications for prices in the euro area because it directly affects import prices and indirectly determines the international competitiveness of the euro area. Those implications are the reason that the Eurosystem included the exchange rate of the euro among the secondpillar indicators. In general, then, the exchange rate policy of the euro is ultimately in the hands of politicians rather than of the ECB. This situation is somewhat puzzling because monetary and exchange rate policies are closely related, and it is impossible to conduct a truly independent policy in one without the other in a world of mostly unrestricted international capital flows.
Be that as it may, the first two and a half years of operation of the EMU (i.e., until the middle of 2001) were somewhat turbulent, with politicians almost continuously demanding lower interest rates to stimulate growth and the ECB increasing them for fear of resurgent inflation in the euro area (only in May 2001 did the ECB reduced the interest rate by a token 0.25 percentage point from 4.75 percent to 4.50 percent)-probably to placate its critics. The conflict in the conduct of a unionwide monetary policy was also evidenced during this period by the fact that nations such as Ireland and Spain faced excessive growth and inflationary pressures, requiring a more restrictive monetary policy, while other nations (such as Germany and Italy) faced anemic growth, requiring lower interest rates. As it was, the ECB adopted an intermediate monetary policy, with interest rates possibly being too low for Ireland and Spain and too high for Germany and Italy (OECD 2000b) .
There is also the question of the effectiveness of a eurowide monetary policy on the various EMU members. Previous research by the IMF (1998) indicated that a rise in interest rates took twice as long to have a significant effect in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands than in France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain but that the final impact was almost twice as large, on average, in the first group of countries than in the second because of their different financial structure. For example, the IMF found that Spanish banks passed an interest rate increase on to customers within three months, while German banks took one year or more because of their closer relationship with customers. Similarly, a country such as Italy, where adjustablerate debt is common, responds faster to interest-rate changes than countries such as Germany, where fixedrate debt is more common. Although the euro will very likely lead to the narrowing of these country differences over time, they are likely to persist at least for several years to come.
A related problem that the EU is likely to face in the conduct of its monetary policy is that various nations are likely to experience very different growth rates (from the estimated trend of real EMU's GDP growth of between 2.0 percent and 2.5 percent per year). Would Germany accept a growth rate much lower than France's, year in and year out, if that is what would result from a common monetary policy without Germany's being able to provide much fiscal stimulus (because of budget restrictions imposed by the Maastricht Treaty) or other strategic help to some industries deemed important for growth? It is true that long-run growth depends primarily on structural conditions and market liberalization and deregulation, but the demand for monetary policy to do its part may be irresistible in a large country facing a constantly lower growth rate than the other EMU member countries and may result in great political conflicts within the EMU? This proposition is especially true in the current situation in which most EMU countries face strong opposition from organized labor to the reduction in social benefits, the increase in the pensionable age, and the ability of firms to fire workers when justified by economic conditions.
It is true that many of these changes would have to be made anyway in the long run, but the euro is creating more pressure to accelerate the time framework for restructuring the economy, and this fact is likely to impose more pressure on the ECB to conduct a monetary policy more accommodating to long-run growth. The ECB and politicians will certainly blame market forces when introducing these changes, but they will have to answer to an electorate that does not necessarily accept the American model of capitalism and that many European politicians themselves have in the past attacked severely to justify the much higher unemployment rate and lower growth rate in Europe than in the United States.
In addition, fiscal policy (which remains a national prerogative) cannot be of much help in overcoming differences in cyclical or growth conditions among EMU members because the Stability and Growth Pact mandates that member countries keep budget deficits below 3 percent of GDP and the debt at less than 60 percent of GDP. With most countries either at or above the permitted limits, fiscal policy cannot be of much use to overcome differences in growth rates among EMU members. In the case of Italy, fiscal policy will have to be restrictive to lower government debt to the allowed limit precisely at the time when its growth is slowest among EMU members.
THE ECB AND THE INTERNATIONAL VALUE OF THE EURO
The euro was introduced on 1 January 1999 at the value of $1.17; it rose to $1.18 on 4 January (the first business day of the new year), but defying almost all predictions, it declined almost continuously, reaching near parity to the dollar at the end of 1999 then falling to a low of $0.82 on 26 October 2000 (see Figures 1 and 2) .
Much has been written on the reasons for the continued depreciation and weakness of the euro with respect to the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen (see Salvatore 2002a) . The fact remains that, defying almost all explanations, the euro has weakened and remained relatively weak since its introduction two and a half years ago. One proposal advanced for strengthening it was the adoption of a target zone for the euro-dollar and euro-yen exchange rates. These were forcefully advanced during mid-1999 by the finance ministers of France (Dominique Stauss-Khan) and Germany (Oscar Lafontaine). But then, the discussion of target zones subsided. Historically, target zones have never really worked. For example, the implicit target zones established by the 1987 Louvre Accord soon collapsed. Even when intervention in foreign exchange markets seems to work (as in the case of the 1985 Plaza Agreement), that intervention was moving in the direction of markets. When counter to markets trends, foreign exchange interventions almost never work.
Nevertheless, the ECB in concert with the New York Fed (which operates as the U.S. central bank for international operations) and the central banks of Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada, in a move that caught the markets by surprise, intervened in foreign exchange markets for the first time on Friday, 22 September 2000, in support of the euro, which had fallen in previous days to its all-time low of $0.82. By the end of the day, the euro had risen to $0.88, but in the following days, the euro fell back to its preintervention level. At the beginning of November 2000, the ECB intervened again several times (but alone) in foreign exchange markets in support of the euro but to no avail. Not even the uncertainty surrounding the election of the president of the United States was sufficient to lift the value of the euro. Only when it became evident, toward the end of November 2000, that the growth rate of the United States had declined sharply and that, as a result, the EU was expected to grow more rapidly than the United States in 2001 did the net capital outflow from Europe to the United States dry up and the euro started to appreciate significantly against the dollar (it reached the value of $0.96 on Friday, 5 January 2001). At the time, this trend was expected to continue with the euro reaching parity with the U.S. by mid-2001.
By the end of May 2001, however, the euro had fallen back to below $0.90 (it was $0.86 on 23 May 2001) as markets anticipated that growth and profitability in the United States would resume in the second half of 2001. Another possible explanation for the strength of the dollar relative to the euro was the continued higher growth of labor productivity in the United States than in the EU. Only if the current U.S. slowdown kills the growth of its labor productivity-so the argument goes-will the euro probably appreciate significantly with respect to the dollar. Still another possible reason for the continued strength of the dollar (and weakness of the euro) is that perhaps investors still see the United States as a safe haven in times (such as the present one) of economic turmoil (due to the financial crisis in Turkey and Argentina, the continued economic crisis in Japan, and danger of renewed financial instability in Brazil and Russia).
As is clear from the above, there is no shortage of explanations for the current strength of the dollar and weakness of the euro, and, as some older explanations are contradicted by emerging facts and evidence, new ones are confidently introduced. Of course, should the dollar begin to depreciate heavily with respect to the euro in the future, all sorts of reasons will be advanced to explain it. In short, there is no economic model or theory that can consistently and accurately predict exchange rate movements in the short run because fundamental forces at work are easily and frequently overwhelmed by transitory ones and "news." One cannot forget the glaring forecasting mistake made by Richard Portes and Helen Rey (1998) at the time the euro/dollar exchange rate was set in the fall of 1998 that that the euro would soon become very strong (i.e., appreciate heavily against the dollar) and could even replace the dollar as the leading international currency within a year of its introduction.
Also important is the relationship between the euro and the currencies of the EU countries that have so far refused to join the euro (the British pound, the Swedish krona, and the Danish krone). The exchange rate between the euro and these other currencies is also likely to be subject to high volatility and misalignments without the establishment of an exchange rate mechanism similar to the ERM. But, as the experience with the 1992-93 ERM crisis showed, such a system is unstable and crisis prone (Salvatore 1996) . It is, however, in the interest of Britain, Sweden, and Denmark to enforce strong limits on the fluctuation of their currencies with respect to the euro in anticipation of their possible joining it in the future and to avoid importing financial instability in the meantime. The introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999 proceeded smoothly and did not create problems for the working of the international monetary system (Salvatore 2002b) . What may create problems is the fact that with most trade and financial relations conducted within, rather than among, the three major trading blocks (the EU, NAFTA, and Asia centered on Japan), there will normally be less concern about the euro/ dollar and euro/yen exchange rate than intrablock rates and less interest in intervening in foreign exchange markets to stabilize exchange rates (only with the deepening depreciation and undervaluation of the euro in 2000 did interest in the euro exchange rate came to the forefront). With less interest and less intervention, it is likely that the euro/dollar and euro/yen exchange rate will continue to be volatile in the future. This tendency arises also because the exchange rate is one of only a few market-equilibrating mechanisms operating among the three major trading blocks. Exchange rates among the three leading currencies are likely to be especially volatile when the three blocks face different cyclical conditions and shifting market perceptions about economic and financial prospects (Buiter 2000) .
By adding to transaction costs, large exchange rate volatility will affect the volume and pattern of international trade. These costs, however, are not very large, and firms engaged in international trade and finance can easily and cheaply cover their foreign exchange risk. Potentially more damaging to the flow of international trade and investments than excessive exchange rate volatility are the wide and persistent exchange rate misalignments (as they seem to have developed in 2000 and 2001 between the euro, on one hand, and the dollar and the yen, on the other). An overvalued currency has the effect of an export tax and an import subsidy for the nation, and as such, it reduces the international competitiveness of the nation or trading block and distorts the pattern of specialization, trade, and payments. A significant exchange rate misalignment that persists for years cannot possibly be hedged away and can impose significant real costs on the economy in the form of unemployment, idle capacity, and bankruptcy, and these may lead to serious protection and trade disputes. This is exactly what happened when the U.S. dollar became grossly overvalued in the mid-1980s.
The only way to limit excessive exchange rate misalignment among the euro, the dollar, and the yen is by greater macroeconomic policy coordination among the three major trading blocks than has hereto been practiced. Successful international policy coordination did prevent the financial crises in emerging markets (Mexico in 1994 -95, East Asia in 1997 -99, Russia in summer 1998 , Brazil in early 1999 , and Argentina and Turkey in 2000-01) from spreading or having a lasting damaging effect on other emerging markets and on advanced market economies. But policy coordination among the Untied States, the euro area, and Japan has been only limited and sporadic rather than extensive and continuous effect in the past, and it is difficult to expect that it will be much higher in the near future. Yet, more policy coordination is exactly what seems to be required to prevent the further development and crystallization of the tripolar (New York, London-Frankfurt, and Tokyo) world financial system, characterized, as it is, by the huge and rapid international capital flows among them, from leading to large exchange rate misalignments and financial instability in the future (IMF 2000a, chap. 4) .
To be sure, by reducing the number of key currencies, the euro simplifies international cooperation among the major economic areas and makes exchanging information and views more efficient. This simplification will be even greater if and when the United Kingdom adopts the euro. At the same time, a trade or exchange rate dispute that before the creation of the euro could have been between the United States and, say, France now becomes a dispute between the United States and the entire euro area. In short, simplification, by having to deal with far fewer major currencies with the euro than without it, also brings the danger that future disputes will be disputes among titans and that trade and exchange rate relations among the major three currency blocks will be governed by strategic behavior and policieswith all of their inherent uncertainties and dangers. The world was certainly simpler (although not necessarily fairer) when there was one hegemonic power (the United States) and only one dominant international or vehicle currency (the dollar) (Tavlas 1997) .
Finally, there is the challenge of the representation of the ECB on international bodies such as the IMF, OECD, and Bank for International Settlements (BIS). As it is, the ECB participates in many international meetings and fora, such as those held by the IMF, OECD, BIS, G7, G20, and so forth, but as an observer rather than a full voting member because most of these institutions and forums restrict membership to individual nations rather than to currency areas. Nevertheless, the ECB's observer status allows it to make its views known. Of course, this situation could change in the future, and the ECB might come increasingly to represent the entire euro area in international bodies and deliberations.
